In this work, we initiate the study of position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim of position-based cryptography is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. This has interesting applications, e.g., it enables two military bases to talk to each other over insecure (i.e. neither private nor authenticated) channels and without having any pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only parties within the bases learn the content of the conversation.
1 Introduction
Background
Recently, Chandran, Goyal, Moriarty, and Ostrovsky [CGMO09] introduced the notion of position-based cryptography. The goal of position-based cryptography is to use the geographical position of a party as its only "credential". For example, one would like to send a message to a party at a geographical position pos with the guarantee that the party can decrypt the message only if he or she is physically present at pos. As noted in [CGMO09] , such a protocol could have important applications: if we trust physical perimeter security and so can guarantee that any person entering a secure facility has been authorized to do so, then one can send messages to a party present inside the facility or allow such parties to access confidential data without having to share any secret or credential information with them.
A central task in position-based cryptography is the problem of secure positioning. We have a prover P at position pos, wishing to convince a set of verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k (at different points in geographical space) that he (i.e. the prover) is indeed at that position pos. The prover can run an interactive protocol with the verifiers in order to do this. The main technique for such a protocol is known as distance bounding [BC94] . In this technique, a verifier sends a random nonce to P and measures the time taken for P to reply back with this value. Assuming that communication takes place at the speed of light, this technique gives an upper bound on the distance of P from the verifier.
The problem of secure positioning has been studied before in the field of wireless security, and there have been several proposals for this task ([BC94, SSW03, VN04, Bus04, CH05, SP05, ZLFW06, CCS06]). However, [CGMO09] show that there exists no protocol for secure positioning that offers security in the presence of multiple colluding adversariesP 1 , . . . ,P . In other words, the set of verifiers cannot distinguish between the case when they are interacting with an honest prover at pos and the case when they are interacting with multiple colluding dishonest provers, none of whom are at position pos. Their impossibility result holds even if we make computational hardness assumptions, and it also rules out most other interesting position-based cryptographic tasks.
In light of the strong impossibility result, [CGMO09] considered a model in which verifiers can broadcast large bursts of information and there is a bound on the amount of information that the set of adversaries can retrieve (this model is known as the Bounded Retrieval Model (BRM) and has been used widely in cryptography). In this model, [CGMO09] constructed information-theoretically secure protocols for the task of secure positioning as well as position-based key exchange (wherein the verifiers in addition to verifying the position claim of a prover, also exchange a secret key with the prover). While these protocols give us a way to realize position-based cryptography, the BRM has its drawbacks. Firstly, it requires verifiers to be able to broadcast large bursts of information and this might be difficult to do; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the bound on the amount of information that an adversary retrieves might be hard to impose. This leaves us with the following question-is there any other assumption or setting in which position-based cryptography is realizable?
Our Approach And Our Results
In this work, we initiate the study of position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. To start with, let us briefly explain why moving to the quantum setting might be useful. The impossibility result of [CGMO09] relies heavily on the fact that an adversary can locally store all information he receives and at the same time share this information with other, colluding adversaries, located elsewhere. Recall that the positive result of [CGMO09] in the BRM circumvents the impossibility result by assuming that an adversary cannot store all information he receives. By going to the quantum setting, one may be able to circumvent the impossibility result thanks to the following observation. If some information is encoded into a quantum state, then the above attack fails due to the no-cloning principle: the adversary can either store the quantum state or send it to a colluding adversary (or do something in-between, like store part of it), but not both! Thus, going to the quantum setting may indeed be a promising approach.
We show in this paper, for the first time, that this is really the case. We put forward quantum cryptographic schemes for several position-based tasks: secure positioning, authentication, and key exchange, and we prove these scheme unconditionally secure against an arbitrary coalition of adversaries. As already mentioned, a secure positioning scheme can be used to convince the verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k of the geographic position pos of P . A position-based authentication scheme on the other hand convinces the verifiers that a message m originates from P at position pos. Finally, a position-based key exchange scheme ensures that the verifiers share a secret key with P at position pos, and anyone that is not at position pos does not have any information regarding the key. If this is possible, and the key is sufficiently long, then perfectly secure communication with a device only located in a certain position is possible. In this paper, we resolve all these questions in the affirmative, in arbitrary dimension, and without any computational nor physical assumptions, and only using quantum laws of physics.
We stress that we prove security of our schemes for the above tasks without any restriction on the power of the adversaries; they may have unbounded classical and quantum memory, and they may have unbounded computing power; the only assumption is that the laws of quantum mechanics hold. Therefore, our results show that position-based quantum cryptography is one of the rare examples besides QKD for which there is a strong separation between classical cryptography and quantum cryptography, in that the latter offers unconditional security whereas the former does not offer any security if the adversary is unrestricted.
An additional attractive feature of all our solutions is that our schemes merely require one of the verifiers, V 0 , to prepare individual qubits and send them to P , and P needs to measure them immediately upon arrival. No quantum computation is needed, and all other communication may be classical.
Our Schemes in More Detail
Secure positioning. Our secure positioning scheme is extremely simple. Let us briefly discuss here the 1-dimensional case in which we have two verifiers V 0 and V 1 , and a prover P at position pos that lies on the straight line between V 0 and V 1 . Now, to verify P 's position, V 0 sends a BB84 qubit H θ |x to P , and V 1 sends the corresponding basis θ to P , so that H θ |x and θ arrive at position pos at the same time. P then has to measure the qubit in the given basis to obtain x, and immediately send x to V 0 and V 1 , who verify the correctness of x and if it has arrived "in time". The intuition why this is secure is the following. Consider a dishonest proverP 0 between V 0 and P , and a dishonest proverP 1 between V 1 and P . 1 When P 0 receives the BB84 qubit, he does not know yet the corresponding basis θ. Thus, if he measures it immediately when he receives it, then he is likely to measure it in the wrong basis andP 0 andP 1 will not be able to provide the correct x. However, if he waits until he knows the basis θ, then it is not too hard to see thatP 0 andP 1 will be too late in sending x to V 1 in time. And, similarly, if he forwards the BB84 qubit toP 1 , who receives θ beforeP 0 does, thenP 0 andP 1 will be too late in sending x to V 0 . It seems that in order to break the schemeP 0 needs to store the qubit until he receives the basis θ and at the same time send a copy of it toP 1 . But this is impossible by no-cloning! Proving the above intuition correct is non-trivial. Our proof is based on the strong complementary information tradeoff (CIT) due to Renes and Boileau [RB09] (see also [BCC + 09]), and it guarantees that for any strategy, the success probability ofP 0 andP 1 is bounded by approximately 0.89. By repeating the above simple scheme sequentially, we obtain a secure multi-round positioning scheme with exponentially small soundness error. On the other hand, parallel repetition of the above scheme would result in a more efficient 1-round scheme. However, the security of the parallel repetition does not necessarily follow from the security of the underlying scheme, and our techniques do not seem strong enough to prove security of the parallel repetition. We leave the security of the parallel repetition as an interesting open problem.
The scheme can easily be extended to arbitrary dimension d. The idea is to involve additional verifiers V 2 , . . . , V d and have the basis θ secret-shared among V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V d . Details are given later.
Position based authentication. Our position-based authentication scheme is based on our secure positioning scheme, combined with a technique used by Renner and Wolf in [RW03] . The idea is to start with a "weak" authentication scheme for a 1-bit message m, which works as follows. The verifiers and P execute the secure positioning scheme; if P wishes to authenticate m = 1, then P correctly finishes the scheme by sending x back, but if P wishes to authenticate m = 0, then P sends back an "erasure" ⊥ instead of the correct reply x with some probability q (which needs to be carefully chosen). This authentication scheme is weak in the sense that turning 1 into 0 is easy for the adversary, but turning a 0 into a 1 fails with constant probability.
The idea is now to use a suitable balanced encoding of the actual message to be authenticated, so that for any two messages, the adversary needs to turn many 0's into 1's. Unfortunately, an arbitrary balanced encoding is not good enough. The reason for this is that we do not assume the verifiers and the honest P to be synchronized. This allows the adversary to make use of honest P who is authenticating one index of the encoded message, in order to authenticate another index of the modified encoded message towards the verifiers.
Nevertheless, we show that for instance the specific encoding which maps 0 into 00...0 11...1 and 1 into 11...1 00...0, where all blocks of 0's and 1's are of length N/2, is good enough. First, we consider a 1-bit message m. The security of the resulting authentication scheme follows from proving that in order to succeed in changing a 0 to a 1 (or vice-versa), an adversary must succeed Ω(N ) times in the secure positioning protocol "on his own" (i.e., without the help of the prover P ) and hence has success probability 2 −Ω(N ) . To authenticate longer messages, we let P sequentially authenticate the message bitwise. Proving that this is secure is non-trivial, again because of the out-of-sync issue, which potentially allows the adversary to intertwine different executions of the authentication scheme between the verifiers and the prover (unless we insert long delays between the executions). Nevertheless, with carefully chosen parameters and a sophisticated analysis, we can show security of the authentication scheme, when executed bit-by-bit, for arbitrary long messages.
Position based key exchange. Given a position-based authentication scheme, one can immediately obtain a position-based key exchange scheme simply by (essentially) executing an arbitrary quantum-keydistribution scheme (e.g. [BB84] ), which assumes an authenticated classical communication channel, and authenticate the classical communication by means of the position-based authentication scheme.
We also suggest a direct and significantly more efficient construction of a position-based key exchange scheme. Unfortunately, our proof techniques do not seem to be strong enough to prove security of that scheme, and thus we can merely conjecture its security. Proving its security (or showing that it is not secure) hence remains an interesting open problem.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we begin by introducing notation, and presenting the relevant background from quantum information theory. In Section 3, we describe our quantum model in more detail. We present our protocol for secure positioning in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to our position-based authentication protocol and finally, in Section 6, we show how to combine the above tools to obtain position-based key exchange.
Preliminaries

Notation and Terminology
Quantum Systems and States. We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of quantum information theory and refer to [NC00] for an excellent introduction; we merely fix some terminology and notation here. A quantum system is associated with a complex Hilbert space, H = C d , its state space. The state of the system is given, in the case of a pure state, by a norm-1 state vector |ψ ∈ H, respectively, in the case of a mixed state, by a trace-1 positive-semi-definite matrix ρ : H → H, called density matrix. We write D(H) for the set of all density matrices acting on H. We typically give quantum systems abstract names, A, B etc., and we write H A for the state space of system A, and ρ A (respectively |ϕ A in case of a pure state) for the state of A. The state space of a bi-partite (or tri-or multi-partite) quantum system AB, which consists of two (or three or more) subsystems, is given by the tensor product
If the state of AB is given by ρ AB then the state of subsystem A on its own is given by the partial trace ρ A = tr B (ρ AB ), and correspondingly for B. In order to simplify language, we are often a bit sloppy in distinguishing between a quantum system, its state, and the state vector or density matrix describing the state.
Measuring a system A in basis {|i } i∈I , where {|i } i∈I is an orthonormal basis of H A , means applying the measurement described by the projectors {|i i|} i∈I . This has the effect that outcome i ∈ I is observed with probability p i = tr(|i i|ρ A ) (respectively p i = | i|ϕ A | 2 in case of a pure state). If A is a subsystem of a bipartite system AB, then it means applying the measurement described by the projectors {|i i| ⊗ I B } i∈I , where I B is the identity operator on H B .
We measure closeness of two states ρ and σ in D(H) by their trace distance: δ(ρ, σ) := 1 2 tr|ρ − σ|. One can show that for any physical processing of ρ respectively σ, the two states behave in an indistinguishable way except with probability at most δ(ρ, σ). Thus, informally, if δ(ρ, σ) is very small then, without making a significant error, the quantum state ρ can be considered to be equal to σ.
Qubits.
A qubit is a quantum system A with state space H A = C 2 . The computational basis {|0 , |1 } (for a qubit) is given by |0 = 
Since we mainly use the above two bases, we can simplify terminology and notation by identifying the computational basis {|0 , |1 } with the bit 0 and the Hadamard basis H {|0 , |1 } with the bit 1. Hence, when we say that an n-qubit state is measures in basis θ ∈ {0, 1} n , we mean that the state is measured qubit-wise where basis H θ i {|0 , |1 } is used for the i-th qubit.
An important example 2-qubit state is the EPR pair
, which has the following properties: if qubit A is measured in the computational basis, then a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is observed and qubit B collapses to |x , and, similarly, if qubit A is measured in the Hadamard basis, then a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is observed and qubit B collapses to H|x .
Classical and Hybrid Systems (and States
. Subsystem X of a bipartite quantum system XE is called classical, if the state of XE is given by a density matrix of the form
where X is a finite set of cardinality |X | = dim(H X ), P X : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution, {|x } x∈X is some fixed orthonormal basis of H X , and ρ x E is a density matrix on H E for every x ∈ X . Such a state, called hybrid state (also known as cq-state, for classical and quantum), can equivalently be understood as consisting of a random variable X with distribution P X and range X , and a system E that is in state ρ x E exactly when X takes on the value x. This formalism naturally extends to two (or more) classical systems X, Y etc. as well as to two (or more) quantum systems.
Some Quantum Information Theory
The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) is given by H(ρ) := −tr ρ log(ρ) , where here and throughout the article, log denotes the binary logarithm. H(ρ) is non-negative and at most log(dim(H)). For a bi-partite quantum state ρ AB ∈ D(H A ⊗ H B ), the conditional von Neumann entropy of A given B is defined as H(ρ AB |B) := H(ρ AB ) − H(ρ B ). In cases where the state ρ AB is clear from the context, we may write H(A|B) instead of H(ρ AB |B). If X and Y are both classical, then H(X|Y ) coincides with the classical conditional Shannon entropy. Furthermore, in case of conditioning (partly) on a classical state, the following holds. The following theorem, known as Holevo bound [Hol73] (see also [NC00] ), plays an important role in many applications of quantum information theory. Informally, it says that measuring only reduces your information. Formally, and tailored to the notation used here, it ensures the following. Theorem 2 (Fano inequality) Let X and Y be random variables with ranges X and Y, respectively, and letX be a guess for X computed solely from Y . Then
In particular, for binary X:
Note that by incorporating the Holevo bound, the Fano inequality can be generalized to hybrid states in order to bound the probability of correctly guessing X by measuring and processing a quantum system E. 3 
Strong Complementary Information Tradeoff
The following entropic uncertainty principle, called strong complementary information tradeoff (CIT) in [RB09] and generalized in [BCC + 09], is at the heart of our security proofs. It relates the uncertainty of the measurement outcome of a system A with the uncertainty of the measurement outcome when the complementary basis is used instead, and it guarantees that there can coexist at most one system E that has full information on both possible outcomes. Note that by the complementary basisθ of a basis θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , we mean the n-bit stringθ = (θ 1 , . . . ,θ n ) ∈ {0, 1} n withθ i = θ i for all i.
Theorem 3 (CIT) Let |ψ AEF ∈ H A ⊗ H E ⊗ H F be an arbitrary tri-partite state, where
Let the hybrid state ρ XEF be obtained by measuring A in basis θ ∈ {0, 1} n , and let the hybrid state σ XEF be obtained by measuring A (of the original state |ψ AEF ) in the complementary basisθ. Then
CIT as expressed above in particular implies the following.
n and let X be the result of measuring A in basis Θ. Then
Proof. By Lemma 1, we can write
Note that ρ θ XE is obtained by measuring A of |ψ AEF in basis θ (and ignoring F ), and ρθ XF is obtained by measuring A of |ψ AEF in the complementary basisθ (and ignoring E). Hence, Theorem 3 applies and we can conclude that H(ρ θ XE |E) + H(ρθ XF |F ) ≥ n and thus H(X|ΘE) + H(X|ΘF ) ≥ n.
The Model
We informally describe the model we use for the upcoming sections, which is a quantum version of the Vanilla (standard) model introduced in [CGMO09] (see there for a full description). We consider entities V 0 , . . . , V k called verifiers and an entity P , the (honest) prover. Additionally, we consider a coalitionP of dishonest provers (or adversaries)P 0 , . . . ,P . All entities can perform arbitrary quantum (and classical) operations and can communicate quantum (and classical) messages among them. 4 For simplicity, we assume that quantum operations and communication is noise-free; however, our results generalize to the more realistic noisy case, assuming that the noise is low enough. We require that the verifiers have a private and authentic channel among themselves, which allows them to coordinate their actions by communicating before, during or after protocol execution. We stress however, that this does not hold for the communication between the verifiers and P :P has full control over the destination of messages communicated between the verifiers and P (both ways). This in particular means that the verifiers do not know per-se if they are communicating with the honest or a dishonest prover (or a coalition of dishonest provers).
The above model, which so far could be described by quantum interactive Turing machines, is now extended by incorporating the notion of time and space. Each entity is assigned an arbitrary but fixed position pos in the d-dimensional space R d , and we assume that messages to be communicated travel with the speed of light, and hence the time needed for a message to travel from one entity to another equals the Euclidean distance between the two (assuming that the speed of light is normalized to 1). This holds for honest and dishonest entities. We assume on the other hand that local computations take no time.
Finally, we assume that the verifiers have precise and synchronized clocks, so that they can coordinate exact times for sending off messages and can measure the exact time at which a message is received. We do not require P 's clock to be precise or in sync with the verifiers. However, we do assume that P 's clock only runs forward (i.e. P cannot be reset). This is the place to mention that we consider only standalone security, i.e., there exists only a single execution of a single honest prover, and we do not guarantee concurrent security.
This model allows to perform reasonings of the following kind. Consider a verifier V 0 that is at position pos 0 and who sends a challenge ch 0 to the (supposedly honest) prover claiming to be at position pos. If V 0 receives a reply within time 2d(pos 0 , pos), where d(·, ·) is the Euclidean distance measure in R d and thus also measures the time a message takes from one point to the other, then V 0 can conclude that he is communicating with a prover that is within distance d(pos 0 , pos).
Throughout the article, we will always (sometimes implicitly) require that the honest prover P is enclosed by the verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k in that the prover's position pos ∈ R d lies within the tetrahedron, i.e., 
Secure Positioning
A secure positioning scheme should allow a prover P at position pos ∈ R d (in d-dimensional space) to convince a set of k+1 verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k , which are located at respective positions pos 0 , . . . , pos k ∈ R d , that he is indeed at position pos. We assume that P is enclosed by V 0 , . . . , V k , i.e., pos ∈ Hull(pos 0 , . . . , pos k ). We require that the verifiers jointly accept if honest prover P is at position pos, and we require that the verifiers reject with "high" probability in case of a dishonest prover that is not at position pos. The latter should hold even if the dishonest prover consist of a coalition of collaborating dishonest proversP 0 , . . . ,P at arbitrary positions apos 0 , . . . , apos ∈ R d with apos i = pos for all i. We refer to [CGMO09] for the general formal definition of the completeness and security of a secure positioning scheme. In this article, we focus on secure positioning schemes that are of the form as specified in the following definition.
Definition 1 A 1-round secure positioning scheme SP consists of a challenge generator Chlg, which outputs a list of challenges (ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) and some auxiliary information x, and a response algorithm Resp, which on input a list of challenges outputs a response x . SP is said to have perfect completeness if Resp(ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) = x with probability 1 for (ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) and x generated by Chlg.
The algorithms Chlg and Resp are used as described in Figure 1 to verify the claimed position of a prover P . We clarify that in order to have all the challenges arrive at P 's (claimed) location pos at the same time, the verifiers agree on a time T and each V i sends off his challenge ch i at time T − d(pos i , pos). 5 As a result, all ch i 's arrive at P 's position pos at time T . In step 3, V i receives x in time if x arrives at V i 's position pos i at time T + d(pos i , pos). Throughout the article, we use this simplified terminology. Furthermore, we are sometimes a bit sloppy in distinguishing a party, like P , from its location pos.
Common input to the verifiers: their positions pos 0 , . . . , pos k , and the (claimed) position pos of P . 0. V 0 generates (ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) and x using Chlg, and sends ch i and x to V i for i = 1, . . . , k.
1. Every V i sends ch i to P in such a way that all ch i 's arrive at the same time at P 's position pos.
2. When all the ch i 's arrive, P computes x := Resp(ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) and sends x to all V i 's. We stress that we allow Chlg and Resp to be quantum algorithms and the challenges ch i to be quantum states, but for simplicity we require x and x to be classical. In our constructions, only ch 0 will actually be quantum, and ch 1 up to ch k will be classical; thus, we will only require quantum communication from V 0 to P , all other communication may be classical. Furthermore, in our constructions, the only thing quantum about the algorithms Chlg and Resp will be that Chlg involves the preparation of a quantum state (namely the challenge ch 0 ) and Resp involves a measurement. Thus, no involved and currently infeasible quantum computations are required. Obviously, for the problem we address here, we only need to consider either an honest prover P or a coalition of dishonest proversP . In the subsequent sections, where we study position-based authentication and key exchange, we will also need to consider a coalition of dishonest provers that attack an honest execution of the scheme between P and the verifiers. A secure positioning scheme can also be understood as a (position-based) identification scheme, where the identification is not done by means of a cryptographic key or a password, but by means of the geographical location.
The Basic Scheme in 1 Dimension
We propose the following basic 1-round secure positioning scheme, given in Figure 2 . It is based on the BB84 encoding. In all our protocols all parties abort if they receive any message which is inconsistent with the protocol, for instance (classical) message with a wrong length, or different number of received qubits than expected, etc. 0. V 0 chooses two random bits x, θ ∈ {0, 1} and sends them privately to V 1 .
1. V 0 prepares the qubit H θ |x and sends it to P , and V 1 sends the bit θ to P , so that H θ |x and θ arrive at the same time at P .
2.
When H θ |x and θ arrive, P measures H θ |x in basis θ to observe x ∈ {0, 1}, and sends x to V 0 and V 1 .
3. V 0 and V 1 accept if on both sides x arrives in time and x = x. A numerical calculation shows that h −1 ( 1 2 ) ≥ 0.11 and thus ε ≤ 0.89. A particular attack for a dishonest proverP , sitting in-between V 0 and P , is to measure the qubit H θ |x in the Breidbart basis, resulting in an acceptance probability of about 0.85. This shows that our analysis is rather tight. 6 Proof. In order to analyze the positioning scheme it is convenient to consider an equivalent purified version, given in Figure 3 . The only difference between the original and the purified scheme is the point in time when V 0 measures A (indeed, preparing |Φ AB and measuring A in basis θ is just one possible way to prepare H θ |x ) and the point in time when V 1 learns x. This, however, has no influence on the view of the (dishonest or honest) prover, nor on the joint distribution of θ, x and x , and thus neither on the probability that V 0 and V 1 accept. It therefore suffices to analyze the purified version. 0 . V 0 and V 1 privately agree on a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1}.
1. V 0 prepares an EPR pair |Φ AB ∈ H A ⊗ H B , keeps qubit A and sends qubit B to P , and V 1 sends the bit θ to P , so that B and θ arrive at the same time at P .
When B and θ arrive, P measures B in basis θ to observe x ∈ {0, 1}, and sends x to V 0 and V 1 . We first consider security against two dishonest proversP 0 andP 1 , whereP 0 is between V 0 and P and P 1 is between V 1 and P . In the end we will argue that a similar argument holds for multiple dishonest provers on either side.
Since V 0 and V 1 do not accept if x does not arrive in time, any potentially successful strategy ofP 0 andP 1 must look as follows. As soon asP 1 receives the bit θ from V 1 , it forwards (a copy of) it toP 0 . Also, as soon asP 0 receives the qubit A, it applies an arbitrary quantum operation to the received qubit A that maps it into a bipartite state E 0 E 1 (with arbitrary state space H E 0 ⊗ H E 1 ), andP 0 keeps E 0 and sends E 1 toP 1 . Then, as soon as P 1 receives θ, it applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to E 0 to obtainx 0 , and as soon asP 1 receives E 1 , it applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to E 1 to obtainx 1 , and both sendx 0 andx 1 immediately to V 0 and V 1 , respectively. We will now argue that the probability thatx 0 = x andx 1 = x is upper bounded by ε as claimed.
Let |ψ A E 0 E 1 ∈ H A ⊗ H E 0 ⊗ H E 1 be the state of the tri-partite system A E 0 E 1 afterP 0 has applied the quantum operation to the qubit B. Note that the quantum operation and thus |ψ A E 0 E 1 does not depend on θ. Recall that x is obtained by measuring A in either the computational (if θ = 0) or the Hadamard (if
Let Y 0 and Y 1 denote the classical information obtained byP 0 andP 1 as a result of measuring E 0 and E 1 , respectively, with bases that may depend on Θ. By the Holevo bound (Theorem 1), it follows from the above that
for at least one i ∈ {0, 1}. By Fano's inequality (Theorem 2), we can conclude that the corresponding error probability
It thus follows that the failure probability
, and the probability of V 0 and V 1 accepting, P [X 0 = X ∧X 1 = X] = 1 − q, is indeed upper bounded by ε as claimed.
It remains to argue that more than two dishonest provers cannot do any better. This can be reasoned similarly to above. Namely, in order to respond in time, the dishonest provers that are closer to V 0 than P must map the qubit A-possibly jointly-into a bipartite state E 0 E 1 without knowing θ, and jointly keep E 0 and send E 1 to the dishonest provers that are "on the other side" of P (i.e., closer to V 1 ). Then, the reply for V 0 needs to be computed from E 0 and θ (possibly jointly by the dishonest provers that are closer to V 0 ), and the response for V 1 from E 1 and θ. Thus, it can be argued as above that the success probability is bounded by ε as claimed.
Reducing the Soundness Error
In order to obtain a secure positioning scheme with a negligible soundness error, we can simply repeat the 1-round scheme SP ε BB84 from Figure 2 . Repeating the scheme n times in sequence, where the verifiers launch the next execution only after the previous one is finished, reduces the soundness error to ε n . This follows immediately from the security of the 1-round scheme.
Corollary 2
The n-fold sequential repetition of SP A more efficient way of repeating SP ε BB84 is by repeating it in parallel: V 0 sends n BB84 qubits H θ 1 |x 1 , . . . , H θn |x n and V 1 sends the corresponding bases θ 1 , . . . , θ n to P so that they all arrive at the same time at P 's position, and P needs to reply with the correct list x 1 , . . . , x n in time. This is obviously more efficient in terms of round complexity and appears to be the preferred solution. Unfortunately, we do not have a proof for the security of the parallel repetition of SP ε BB84 . We state its security as a conjecture and leave it as an open problem to resolve it.
Conjecture 1
The n-fold parallel repetition of SP ε BB84 from Figure 2 is δ n -sound for some δ < 1.
We actually suspect δ to be cos(π/8) 2 ≈ 0.85, which is obtained by measuring all qubits in the Breidbart basis.
We would like to point out that, similar to the proof of Theorem 4, the CIT (Corollary 1) allows to conclude that at least one ofP 0 andP 1 has Shannon entropy n/2 in the n-bit string X to be guessed. However, this is not sufficient to conclude that the guessing probability is negligible.
Secure Positioning in Higher Dimensions
The scheme SP ε BB84 can easily be extended into higher dimensions. For the sake of concreteness, we consider here 3 dimensions. For 3 dimensions, we need at set of (at least) 4 non-coplanar verifiers V 0 , . . . , V 3 , and the prover P needs to be located inside the tetrahedron defined by the positions of the 4 verifiers.
The scheme for 3 dimensions is a generalization of the scheme SP ε BB84 in Figure 2 , where now the challenges of the verifiers V 1 , V 2 and V 3 form a sum sharing of the basis θ, i.e., are random θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ∈ {0, 1} such that their modulo-2 sum equals θ. As specified in Figure 1 , the state H θ |x and the shares θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 are sent by the verifiers to P such that they arrive at P 's (claimed) position at the same time. P can then reconstruct θ and measure H θ |x in the correct basis to obtain x = x, which he sends to all the verifiers who check if x arrives in time and equals x.
We can argue security by a reduction to the scheme in 1 dimension. We consider a coalition of dishonest proversP 0 , . . . ,P at arbitrary positions but different to P . We may assume thatP 0 is closest to V 0 . It is easy to see that there exists a verifier V j such that d(P 0 , V j ) > d(P, V j ). Furthermore, we may assume that V j is not V 0 and thus we assume for concreteness that it is V 1 . We now strengthen the dishonest provers by giving them θ 2 and θ 3 for free from the beginning. Since, when θ 2 and θ 3 are given, θ can be computed from θ 1 and vice versa, we may assume that V 1 actually sends θ as challenge rather than θ 1 . But now, θ 2 and θ 3 are now just two random bits, independent of θ and x, and are thus of no help to the dishonest provers and we can safely ignore them.
AsP 0 is further away from V 1 than P is,P 0 cannot afford to store H θ |x until he has learned θ. Indeed, otherwise V 1 will not get a reply in time. Therefore, before he learns θ,P 0 needs to apply a quantum transformation to H θ |x with a bi-partite output and keep one part of the output, E 0 , and send the other part, E 1 in direction of V 1 . Note that this quantum transformation is independent of θ. Then,x 0 andx 1 , the replies that are sent to V 0 and V 1 , respectively, need then to be computed from θ and E 0 alone and from θ and E 1 alone. It now follows from the analysis of the scheme in 1 dimension that the probability that bothx 0 andx 1 coincide with x is at most ε = 1 − h −1 ( 1 2 ).
Corollary 3
The above generalization of SP
Position-Based Authentication
In this section we consider a new primitive: position-based authentication. In contrast to secure positioning, where the goal of the verifiers is to make sure that entity P is at the claimed location pos, here the verifiers want to make sure that a given message m originates from an entity P that is at the claimed location pos. We stress that it is not sufficient to first execute a secure positioning scheme with P to ensure that P is at position pos and then have P send or confirm m, because a coalition of dishonest provers may do a man-in-the-middle attack and stay passive during the execution of the positioning scheme but then modify the communicated message m. Formally, in a position-based authentication scheme, the prover takes as input a message m and the verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k take as input a message m and the claimed position pos of P , and we require the following security properties. We build a position-based authentication scheme based on our secure positioning scheme. The idea is to incorporate the message to be authenticated into the replies of the positioning scheme. Our construction is very generic and may also be useful for turning other kinds of identification schemes (not necessarily position-based schemes) into corresponding authentication schemes. We begin by proposing a weak but simple position-based authentication scheme for 1-bit message m.
Weak 1-bit authentication scheme
Let SP ε be a secure 1-round secure positioning scheme between k + 1 verifiers V 0 , . . . , V k and a prover P . We require SP ε to have perfect completeness and soundness ε < 1. SP ε may for instance be the scheme SP ε BB84 from Section 4. We let ⊥ be some special symbol. We consider the weak authentication scheme given in Figure 4 for a 1-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that m has already been communicated to the verifiers and thus there is agreement among the verifiers on the message to be authenticated. The weak authentication scheme works by executing the 1-round secure positioning scheme SP ε , but letting P replace his response x by an "erasure" (i.e. by ⊥) with probability q, where we choose 0 < q < (1 − ε)/4. 0. V 0 generates (ch 0 , . . . , ch k ) and x using Chlg and sends ch i and x to V i for i = 1, . . . , k. We now analyze the success probability of an adversary authenticating a bit m ∈ {0, 1}. We consider the case where there is no honest prover present (we call this an impersonation attack), and the case where an honest prover is active and authenticates the bit m = m (we call this a substitution attack).
Every verifier
The following properties are easy to verify and follow from the security property of SP ε .
Lemma 2 LetP be a coalition of dishonest provers not at the claimed position and trying to authenticate message m = 1. In case of an impersonation attack, the verifiers accept with probability at most ε, and in case of a substitution attack (with m = 0), the verifiers accept with probability at most δ = 1 − q(1 − ε) < 1.
On the other hand,P can obviously authenticate m = 0 by means of a substitution attack with success probability 1; however, informally,P has bounded success probability in authenticating message m = 0 by means of an impersonation attack unless he uses tag ⊥. (This fact is used latter to obtain a strong authentication scheme.)
Let us try to extend the above in order to get a strong authentication scheme. Based on the observation that by performing a substitution attack on wAUTH ε , it is easy to substitute the message bit m = 1 by m = 0 but non-trivial to substitute m = 0 by m = 1, a first approach to obtain an authentication scheme with good security might be to apply wAUTH ε bitwise to a balanced encoding of the message. Such an encoding should ensure that for any distinct messages m and m , there are many positions in which the encoding of m is 1 but then encoding of m is 0. Unfortunately, this is not good enough. The reason is that P and the verifiers are not necessarily synchronized. For instance, assume we encode m = 0 into c = 010101...01 and m = 1 into c = 101010...10, and authentication works by doing wAUTH ε bit-wise on all the bits of the encoded message. IfP wants to substitute m = 0 by m = 1 then he can simply do the following. He tries to authenticate the first bit 1 of c towards the verifiers by means of an impersonation attack. If he succeeds, which he can with constant probability, then he simply authenticates the remaining bits 01010...10 of c by using P , who is happy to authenticate all of the bits of c = 010101...01! Because of this issue ofP bringing P and the verifiers out of sync, we need to be careful about the exact choice of the encoding of the message.
Secure Position-Based Authentication Scheme
To prevent the adversary from using the honest provers replay, we must encode m using a code with certain properties. For this purpose we introduce the notion of dominating codes.
Definition 3 Let c ∈ {0, 1} N . A vector e ∈ {−1, 0, 1} 2N is called an embedding of c if by removing all the −1 entries in e we obtain c. Furthermore, for two strings c, c ∈ {0, 1} N we say that c dominates c if for all embeddings e and e of c and c (at least) one of the following holds: (a) the number of positions i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N } for which e i = 1 and e i < 1 is Ω(N ), or (b) the number of positions for which e i = 0 and e i = −1 is Ω(N ) and is larger than the number of positions for which e i = 0 but e i ∈ {0, 1}. Corollary 4 Let C be a dominating code (with |C| ≥ 2) and let c ∈ C. Define n 0 , n 1 to be the number of 0s and the number of 1s in c, then for every c ∈ C, n 0 = Ω(N ), n 1 = Ω(N ).
Let wAUTH ε be the above weak authentication scheme satisfying Lemma 2. In order to authenticate a 1-bit message m ∈ {0, 1} in a strong way, an encoding c of m using a dominating code C is bit-wise authenticated by means of wAUTH ε , and the verifies perform statistics over the number of ⊥s received. A possible choice for C is the balanced repetition code C BR = {00...0 11...1, 11...1 00...0} ⊂ {0, 1} N . The resulting authentication scheme is given in Figure 5 ; as for the weak scheme, we assume that the message m has already been communicated. 0 . P and the verifiers encode m into a codeword c = (c 1 , . . . , c N ) ∈ C, for a dominating code C.
1. For j = 1, . . . , N , the following is repeated in sequence.
2.1 P authenticates c j by means of wAUTH ε . Let t i be the corresponding tag received.
2.2
The verifiers keep track of the number of rounds in which P replied with ⊥, i.e., they compute n 0 = | {j : c j = 0} | and n ⊥ = | {j : c j = 0 ∧ t j = ⊥} |. Proof. An honest prover which follows the above scheme can fail only if n ⊥ > 2qn 0 . Using Chernoff bound [Che52] , the probability of having n ⊥ > 2qn 0 is upper bounded by e −qn 0 /2 . Since for every c ∈ C, n 0 = Ω(N ) (Corollary 4), the theorem follows.
If any of the wAUTH
Before we analyze the security of the authentication scheme, let us discuss the possible attacks on it.
Here we treatP as a single identity, howeverP represents a collaboration of adversaries. Similarly, we refer the k + 1 verifiers as a single entity, V . We point out that we do not assume that honest P and V have synchronized clocks. Therefore, we allowP to arbitrarily schedule and interleave the N executions of wAUTH ε that V performs with the N executions that P performs. The only restriction on the scheduling is that P as well as V perform their executions of wAUTH ε in the specified order. This means that at any point in time during the attack when P has executed wAUTH ε for the bits c 1 , . . . , c j−1 and V has executed wAUTH ε for the bits c 1 , . . . , c j −1 and both are momentarily inactive (at the beginning of the attack: j = j = 1),P can perform one of the following three actions.
(1) Activate V to run wAUTH ε on c j but not active P ; this corresponds to an impersonation attack. (2) Activate V to run wAUTH ε on c j and activate P to run wAUTH ε on c j ; this corresponds to a substitution attack if c j = c j . (3) Activate P to run wAUTH ε on c j but not activate V ; this corresponds to "fast-forwarding" P . We note thatP 's choice on which action to perform may be adaptive and depend on what he has seen so far. However, since V and P execute wAUTH ε for each position within c independently, information gathered from previous executions of wAUTH ε does not improveP 's success probability to break the next execution.
It is now easy to see that any attack with its (adaptive) choices of (1), (2) or (3) leads to embeddings e and e of c and c , respectively. Indeed, start with empty strings e = e = ∅ and update them as follows. For every ofP 's rounds where he chooses between (1), (2) or (3), update e by e ‡ and e by e c j ifP chooses (1) , update e by ec j and e by e c j if he chooses (2), and update e by ec j and e by e ‡ if he chooses (3). In the end, complete e and e by padding them with sufficiently many ‡s to have them of length 2N . It is clear that the obtained e and e are indeed valid embeddings of c and c , respectively, with ‡ representing positions with value −1.
Theorem 6
For any ε > 0, the position-based authentication scheme from Figure 5 is 2 −Ω(N ) -sound. Proof. Let m and m = m be the messages input by P and the verifiers, respectively, and let c and c be their encodings. Furthermore, let e and e be their embeddings, determined (as explained above) bŷ P 's attack. By the condition on the dominating code C we know that one of the following two properties (a) or (b) holds. (a) The number of positions i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N } for which e i = 1 and e i ∈ {−1, 0} is Ω(N ). In this case, by construction of the embeddings, in his attackP needs to authenticate (using wAUTH ε ) the bit 1 a linear number of times (by means of an impersonation or a substitution attack). By Lemma 2, the success probability ofP is thus at most δ Ω(N ) , which is 2 −Ω(N ) . (b) Defining the index subsets Bad := {i : e i = 0 ∧ e i = −1} and Good := {i : e i = 0 ∧ e i ∈ {0, 1}}, it holds that |Bad| = Ω(N ) and |Bad| ≥ |Good|. In this case, we can argue as follows. For any i with e i = 0,P needs to authenticate (using wAUTH ε ) the bit 0 by means of an impersonation attack, but he may only use ⊥ as tag for a 2q-fraction of those i's. This means that he may use ⊥ as tag for at most a 4q-fraction of the i's in Bad, and for all the remaining i ∈ Bad he must provide the correct reply to the underlying secure positioning scheme. However, by the ε-soundness of SP ε , where ε < 1 − 4q, the probability ofP succeeding in this is exponentially small (in N , determined by the choice of code).
Plugging in the concrete secure positioning scheme from Section 4.3, we obtain a secure realization of position-based authentication scheme in R d . The scheme is described in Appendix C.1 (Figure 7 ).
Authenticating Arbitrarily-Long Messages
Although the scheme AUTH from above is designed for 1-bit messages, it can be used to authenticate messages m of arbitrary length. We assume that the verifiers expect a message of a fixed length n, and that the executions of wAUTH ε are performed in the specified order. Extending the authentication scheme to arbitrary lengths can be done in the following ways:
One can try to find dominating codes for larger message spaces [if such codes exist]; then the scheme AUTH and its analysis can stay unchanged. Another method would be to encode the message m bit-by-bit using a dominating code (for each bit). The encoding of m might not result in a dominating code and thus AUTH might not be secure for this case, if the adversary is allowed to interleave authentication executions of adjacent m's bits. In Appendix B (see Theorem 7) we show that the security of the sequential application of AUTH can also be shown by a careful choice of the probability q, namely, q < (1 + ε)/16n, and a careful choice of the code C, namely the balanced repetition code C BR , and a more involved analysis.
We point out that the above approach results in rather inefficient position-based authentication schemes that require a large number of communication rounds. For large messages, the efficiency can be somewhat improved by using generic techniques, like first authenticating the message m by means of a standard authentication code with a (short) key randomly chosen by P , and then simultaneously announcing and authenticating the key by means of the position-based authentication scheme. Finding significantly more efficient solutions, and in particular finding 1-round position-based authentication schemes, is left as an interesting open problem.
Position-Based Key Exchange
The goal of a position-based key exchange scheme is to have the verifiers agree with honest prover P at location pos on a key K ∈ {0, 1}
L , in such a way that no dishonest prover has any (non-negligible amount of) information on K beyond its bit-length L, as long as he is not located at pos. 7 Formally, we require the following security properties. ε c -Completeness: If P is honest and at the claimed position pos, and if there is no (coalition of) dishonest prover(s), then P and V 0 , . . . , V k output the same key K of positive length, except with probability ε c .
ε s -Security: For any position pos ∈ Hull(pos 0 , . . . , pos k ) and for any coalitionP of dishonest provers at locations all different to pos, the hybrid state ρ KE , consisting of the key K output by the verifiers and the collective quantum system ofP at the end of the scheme, satisfies δ(ρ KE , ρK E ) ≤ ε s , wherẽ K is chosen independently and at random of the same bit-length as K.
Note that the security properties only ensure that the verifiers can be convinced thatP has no information on the key they obtain; no such security is guaranteed for P . Indeed,P can always honestly execute the scheme with P , acting as verifiers. Also note that the security properties do not provide any guarantee to the verifiers that P has obtained the same key in case of an active attack byP , but this can always be achieved e.g. with the help of a position-based authentication scheme by having P send an authenticated hash of his key.
A Generic Construction
A position-based key exchange scheme can easily be obtained by taking any quantum key-distribution (QKD) scheme that requires authenticated communication, and do the authentication by means of a position-based authentication scheme, like the scheme from the previous section. One subtlety to take care of is that QKD schemes usually require two-way authentication, whereas position-based authentication only provides authentication from the prover to the verifiers. However, this can easily be resolved as follows. Whenever the QKD scheme instructs V 0 (acting as Alice in the QKD scheme) to send a message m in an authenticated way to P (acting as Bob), V 0 sends m without authentication to P , but then in the next step P authenticates the message m he has received (supposedly m = m) toward the verifiers, who abort and output an empty key K in case the authentication fails.
Using the standard 8 BB84 scheme as our QKD, we obtain the position-based key exchange scheme described in Appendix C.2. The security of this scheme follows from the security of the BB84 protocol [LC99, BBB + 00, SP00, May01, BOHL + 05] and of the position-based authentication scheme.
Due to the inefficiency of the underlying authentication scheme, the above construction is very inefficient, in particular in the number of communication rounds. Thus, the above should be considered as a proof that position-based quantum key exchange with unconditional security is possible in principle. We leave the search for efficient position-based key exchange schemes for future research, possibly inspired by the approach from the next section.
A Direct Construction with Conjectured Security
We propose a simple and relatively efficient position-based key exchange scheme. Unfortunately we do not have a security proof, and we leave it as an open problem to find an attack or prove its security. For simplicity, we describe it for the 1-dimensional setting, with two verifiers; a scheme for higher dimensions can be obtained by the same approach as in Section 4. 3. The scheme is parameterized by positive integers N and L, and it makes use of a universal hash function g : R × {0, 1} N → {0, 1} L . The purpose of the universal hash function is to perform privacy amplification. 7 The length L of the key may depend on the course of the scheme. In particular, an adversary may enforce it to be 0.
8 More accurately, we use a variant of BB84 in which the entire classical authenticated communication is performed from P to V . However, the standard BB84 scheme (with two-directional authenticated channel) can still be used using the method described above.
The scheme is given in Figure 6 below. 2 −Ω(N ) -Completeness is trivially satisfied; below, we state the security of the scheme as a conjecture. 0 . V 0 and V 1 privately agree on two random strings x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ N ) in {0, 1} N .
1. For i = 1, . . . , N , the following is repeated (in sequence or in parallel).
1.1 V 0 prepares the qubit H θ i |x i and sends it to P , and V 1 sends the bit θ i to P , so that H θ i |x i and θ i arrive at the same time at P . 1.2 When H θ i |x i and θ i arrive, P measures H θ i |x i in basis θ i to observe x i ∈ {0, 1}. Furthermore, P sets x i := x i with probability N , then V 0 and V 1 abort. Otherwise, V 0 chooses a random seed r ∈ R and sends it to P , and V 0 and P compute K and K respectively as K = g(r, x) and K = g(r, x ). 
Conclusion
We have initiated an exciting new line of research: position-based quantum cryptography. We have shown the existence of quantum cryptographic schemes for position-based tasks that can be rigorously proven secure without assuming any limitation on the adversaries' resources -security is based solely on the laws of quantum mechanics. In combination with the impossibility result of [CGMO09] , this shows a strong separation between classical and quantum cryptography, similarly to the case of QKD. On the other hand, our schemes with conjectured security show that position-based quantum cryptography still offers room for further interesting research. 
In general, we can no conclude that
which proves the claim.
B Authenticating Bit-Wise Encoded Messages is Secure
We now prove that the authentication scheme of Figure 5 can be used to authenticate a message of arbitrary length n. This is obtained by setting q ≤ (1−ε)/16n, and encoding the message m = m 1 m 2 · · · m n bit-wise by means of the balanced repetition code C BR ⊂ {0, 1} N which maps 0 into C BR (0) = 000...0 111...1 and 1 into C BR (1) = 111...1 000...0, where the 0-and the 1-blocks are of length N/2. 9 For simplicity we assume that N is even.
Lemma 3
Assume that an adversary tries to authenticate c ∈ {0, 1} N by performing impersonation attack at least γN times, for some constant γ (i.e., using only (1 − γ)N callings to P ). Let n 0 = |{j : c j = 0}|, then for 1 8n n 0 < γ ≤ 1, and q < (1 − ε)/16n the probability of success is bounded by
Proof. We will assume that the adversary succeeds to authenticate the remaining (1 − γ)N rounds with probability 1. In this case, the adversary is allowed to answer ⊥ at most 2qn 0 N < Lemma 4 Assume m ∈ {0, 1} n is encoded bitwise to c =c 1c2 · · ·c n , withc i ∈ {0, 1} N , by means of the balance repetition code C BR . Then in order to authenticate a position i in which m i = m i , the adversary must call P at least N/8 times with positions that are not inc i , i.e., at least N/8 bits ofc j , j = i, otherwise his success probability is bounded by 2 −Ω(N ) . The notion of dominating can be extended in a trivial way to codewords of unequal lengths, and using this extended notion, it is easy to verify that c dominates c. As a corollary of Theorem 6, any authentication of (a message with encoding) c which is performed using an honest prover replies for the encoding c would fail with high probability as long c dominates c. We can conclude that the adversary can not authenticate c except with a negligible probability, by using less than N/8 calls of P with positions inc j , j = i. We can conclude that using this encoding, any adversary that tries to authenticate m = m must use P 's responses for some blockc j in order to authenticatec i , if m i = m i . Now, when trying to authenticate the blockc j , the adversary would face a problem, since many of P 's responses for that block are used for authenticatingc i . The following theorem shows that there exist at least one blockc i that the adversary would fail to authenticate with high probability, and thus the scheme is secure.
Proof. Look at an index
Theorem 7 If the balanced repetition code C BR ⊂ {0, 1}
N is used as code C, and if q is chosen 0 < q ≤ (1 − ε)/16n in the underlying scheme wAUTH ε , then the bit-wise execution of the authentication scheme from Figure 5 is 2 −Ω(N/n) -sound for n-bit messages.
Thus, in order to get an exponentially small soundness error, N has to be chosen quadratic in n.
Proof. Since m = m there exists position i which they differ, m i = m i . By lemma 4, in order to authenticate the blockc i the adversary must use P with at least N/8 positions inc j , j = i. It follows that at least N/16 are taken from one of the adjacent 10 blocksc j , j = i ± 1. Without loss of generality we assume that j = i + 1; the proof for j = i − 1 is similar.
Let us look on the case where the adversary authenticatesc j . The adversary can not use P replies of c i , but it can use ξ replies from the consecutive block j + 1. If ξ ≤ N/16 − N/16n than by Lemma 3, the success probability for authenticating j is negligible. Otherwise, ξ > N/16 − N/16n, which must be taken fromc j+1 . The same reasoning holds for the (j + 1)-th block: N/16 − N/16n ofc j+1 positions were used for block j; then either the adversary uses less than N/16 − 2 · (N/16n) positions fromc j+2 and fails by Lemma 3 or otherwise, we can focus on the authentication of the (j + 2)-th block instead. This continues until we reach the last blockc n which has no consecutive block to use, yet the previous round called P for at least N/16−(n−1)(N/16n) = N/16n times with positions fromc n , and by Lemma 3 the authentication of n-th block would fail. We conclude that at least one of the blocks along the way will fail (with high probability).
C Concrete realization of quantum position-based primitives
In this section we describe a position-based message authentication scheme, and a position-based key exchange protocol, both based on the secure positioning scheme SP ε BB84 described in Figure 2 C.1 Position-Based Authentication scheme based on SP ε
BB84
The following is a realization of a 2 −Ω(N ) -complete and 2 −Ω(N ) -sound position-based authentication scheme, based on the general authentication scheme ( Figure 5 ) with SP ε BB84 as the underlying secure-positioning primitive. The scheme can be used either for 1-bit message m or an arbitrary length message, using the methods described in section 5.3. 0. V 0 , . . . , V k privately agree on two random strings x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) and θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) in {0, 1} k , 1. The verifiers and P encode the message m into a codeword c ∈ C, for a dominating code C ⊆ {0, 1} N .
2. For i = 1, . . . , N , the following is repeated in sequence.
2.1 V 0 prepares the qubit H θ i |x i and sends it to P . V 1 , . . . , V k send a k-out-of-k sharing of the bit θ i to P , so that H θ i |x i and (all the shares of) θ i arrive at the same time at P . 2.2 When H θ i |x i and θ i arrive, P measures H θ i |x i in basis H θ i {|0 , |1 } to observe x i ∈ {0, 1}. 2.3 If c i = 1, P sends x i to V 1 , . . . , V k . Otherwise, P sends back x i with probability 1 − q or ⊥ with probability q. 2.4 Let t i be the corresponding tag received. V 0 , . . . , V k check that t i arrives in time and that all sides received the same tag t i . If t i = x i and (c i = 0, t i = ⊥), the verifiers abort. 2.5 The verifiers keep track of the number of rounds in which P replied with ⊥, i.e., they compute n 0 = | {j : c j = 0} | and n ⊥ = |{j : c j = 0 ∧ x j = ⊥}|. The following is a realization of a position-based quantum key exchange protocol. The scheme uses BB84 as the underlying QKD system, and realizes position-based authentication using SP ε BB84 described in Figure 2 .
